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INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
Michael J. Gerhardt*
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Professor Christina Whitman of the University of Michigan
Law School joined the chorus of law professors criticizing the
Supreme Court's decisions in municipal liability cases under § 1983.1
Her complaint differed, however, from all of the other criticisms. She
argued that the problem in the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services2 and its progeny3 involving gov-
ernment responsibility for constitutional torts was that the Supreme
Court had mistakenly applied the language of common law torts.4 She
regarded this tendency as misguided because "tort language leads
[Supreme Court justices] to look for individual choices and motives,
for an actor or a 'mind' that can be evaluated. In most of these cases
the possibility of looking at an institution as a unit distinct from the
separate individuals who compose it is not considered."' 5 As an alter-
native, Professor Whitman proposed that in cases involving govern-
mental responsibility for constitutional torts the Court should:
evaluate harms created by structures and contexts rather than by
individuals.... [To date,] the Justices fail to see that injuries can be
brought about quite inadvertently through the workings of institu-
tional structures-through the massing or fragmentation of author-
ity, or by the creation of a culture in which responses and a sense of
responsibility are distorted. 6
In other words, governmental entities such as municipalities are or-
ganic, do not operate monolithically, and create or cause conse-
* Professor, The College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. B.A. Yale Uni-
versity; M.Sc. London School of Economics; J.D. University of Chicago. I am grateful to Alan
Meese and to the participants in the DePaul Law Review's Symposium: Section 1983 Municipal
Liability in Civil Rights Litigation, particularly Susan Bandes, Jack Beermann, Karen Blum, and
Judge David Hamilton, for their helpful comments on the themes of this Article.
1. Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 225 (1986).
2. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3. See infra notes 11, 28-30 and accompanying text.
4. Whitman, supra note 1, at 234.
5. Id. at 226.
6. Id.
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quences as the result of deliberate misbehavior by certain officials as
well as accidental or inevitable harm due to certain structural designs
and dynamics.
Since the publication of Professor Whitman's article over twelve
years ago, institutional analysis has become increasingly popular in
legal scholarship, particularly in the work of law and economics.
While such analysis has permeated a good deal of administrative law
and constitutional commentary (particularly with respect to congres-
sional operations), neither the Court nor legal scholars have employed
it or investigated its utility in § 1983 litigation. Indeed, the Court for
more than a decade has taken precisely the opposite direction-striv-
ing mightily to curb the possibility of holding cities liable on a respon-
deat superior basis rather than adopting or following the "structural
analysis ' 7 Professor Whitman had found attractive in such earlier
cases as Parratt v. Taylor8 and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.9 Of
course, not long after the publication of her article, the Court over-
ruled Parratt in Daniels v. Williams.10 In subsequent cases, including
the Court's two 1997 decisions in this area," the Court has gone to
great lengths to fit the individual tort model to its analysis in munici-
pal liability cases under § 1983.
Part I of this Article attempts to assess the problems engendered by
the Court's persistent embrace of the individual tort model in § 1983
cases as the primary means of avoiding holding cities vicariously liable
for their employees' mistakes or misconduct.' 2 Reevaluating the
mode of analysis in municipal liability cases is opportune in light of
the fact that three dissenting justices in the 1997 case of Board of
County Commissioners v. Brown 13-Justices Souter, Stevens, and
Breyer-have taken the position that the time has come to reconsider
Monell. 4 It is not clear whether the dissenters in Brown intend to
substitute institutional analysis for the approach undertaken in Monell
and its progeny. Nevertheless, it is clear that the balance at the heart
of Monell-between protecting the basic autonomy and financial in-
tegrity of city governments and vindicating the federal rights of citi-
zens injured in some fashion by some official municipal action-has
7. Id. at 269-70.
8. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
9. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
10. 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
11. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe
County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
12. See infra Part I.
13. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
14. Id. at 430.
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become overly skewed in favor of the former concern. The original
balance between competing concerns at the heart of Monell has
largely been lost, and it has been lost largely because of the deficient
means of analysis employed by the Supreme Court in § 1983 cases
involving questions about municipal liability for constitutional torts.
Also lost in this balance has been any pretense by the Supreme Court
(or at least a working majority of its justices) to interpret § 1983 pur-
suant to its basic language and purpose.
Part II examines an alternative mode of analysis for deciding ques-
tions about government responsibility for constitutional torts under
§ 1983-namely, institutional competence. 15 The latter approach has
at least two advantages over the traditional mode of analysis em-
ployed in municipal liability cases: institutional analysis is consistent
with the legislative history and text of § 1983, and it posits clear stan-
dards for determining municipal responsibility under § 1983 that
would constrain judicial discretion while providing clear notice to lo-
cal and state officials of the kinds of actions for which municipal liabil-
ity under § 1983 ensues.
The major problem engendered by the use of institutional analysis
in § 1983 cases has to do with whether it is consistent with the plain
language of § 1983, which imposes municipal liability against any
"person" acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage" that causes the deprivation of federal rights.16 This
problem is largely illusory, because a major point of institutional anal-
ysis is to clarify for judges and local and state officials the practices or
circumstances that constitute the kinds of governmental actions for
which municipal liability under § 1983 would result.
Part III examines the kinds of questions raised by institutional anal-
ysis in § 1983 cases. 17 Institutional analysis largely focuses on the
likely consequences or outcomes of various external and internal ar-
rangements, including formal and informal modes of operations or un-
derstandings. Part III illustrates how this focus would produce
different results in some of the major § 1983 cases litigated in recent
years.
I.
I will forego repeating either the development of municipal liability
jurisprudence under § 1983 or the pertinent legislative history of the
15. See infra Part II.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
17. See infra Part I1.
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act, for I have previously set forth a view on the former 18 and Profes-
sor Jack Beermann has provided an excellent survey of the latter.19
Nor will I reiterate Professor Whitman's cogent analysis of the
Supreme Court's commitment to the individual tort model in munici-
pal liability cases arising under § 1983. Instead, I will briefly clarify
how institutional analysis fits within the Court's municipal liability
jurisprudence.
The obvious place to begin is Monroe v. Pape.20 Prior to Monroe,
plaintiffs could succeed in § 1983 actions only by showing that an indi-
vidual was acting pursuant to a state policy or law. Since plaintiffs
rarely, if ever, could make such a showing (since the governmental
defendants argued that as long as no state law or local ordinance com-
manded the actions in question, those actions were ultra vires and thus
not sanctioned nor approved in any way by state or local authority),
§ 1983 had become virtually dormant. Monroe revitalized § 1983, for
it held that any "person" who violates the Constitution while acting in
his or her official capacity is liable under § 1983.21 That is, the fact
that someone was acting in an official capacity ipso facto established
that he or she was acting "under color of state law" at the time of the
constitutional violation.
If the Court had found further that a municipality is a "person" for
purposes of § 1983, it would have meant that a city is always liable
whenever one of its agents is liable, because agent liability depends
upon the fact that the agent is acting in an official capacity. But the
Court found otherwise. 22 It read the legislative history of § 1983 as
precluding such a finding.2 3 The Court concluded that the term "per-
son" was not meant to include municipalities, even though the Court
had noted that § 1983 had been enacted against the backdrop of the
common law of torts in 1871 and that the latter common law allowed
corporations generally to be held liable on the basis of the doctrine of
respondeat superior.24
After Monroe, the Court repeatedly rejected making cities liable on
the basis of respondeat superior for the civil rights violations of their
employees. Instead, the Court insisted that municipal liability, if it
18. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Munici-
pal Liability Under § 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539 (1989).
19. Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REv.
627 (1999).
20. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
21. Id. at 183-87.
22. Id. at 191.
23. Id. at 188-91.
24. See id. at 190.
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were to be possible at all under § 1983, had to be based on some evi-
dence or demonstration of intent on the part of the city to violate the
Constitution. The search for intent became the main path by which
the Court tried to allow for the vindication of federal rights under
§ 1983 while avoiding making cities liable on the basis of respondeat
superior.
For example, in 1978, the Court in Monell had three choices: (1)
reaffirm Monroe completely; (2) make municipalities vicariously liable
for the actions of their employees-an outcome that would have par-
alleled corporate liability in common law torts; or (3) adopt an inter-
mediate solution. The Court chose the third option. In particular, the
majority struck a balance between making municipalities accountable
in federal court for their constitutional violations and accommodating
federalism concerns, including respect for the autonomy and financial
integrity of states and local governments.2 5 The Court adopted an ex-
tremely formal analysis to reject the possibility of vicarious liability.
Its formalistic analysis was designed to link municipalities to alleged
constitutional injuries in a way that parallels the link between the act
of an individual defendant and a plaintiff's injury in tort. As Professor
Whitman has explained:
[T]he Court seemed to be looking for something parallel to an indi-
vidual's decision to act, some indication of will or intent ...
[F]ormal policies are not in any real sense analogous to individual
decisions to act; they are more closely analogous to formal state-
ments or descriptions by individuals of intent to act. The obvious
problem with limiting liability to situations in which the actor ex-
presses his or her or its intent to act is that liability can often be
avoided by ... keeping silent. That, presumably, is why the Court
included liability based on "official custom" as well as "official
policy."26
But, the Court stressed, the "custom" must be "so permanent and well
settled as to [have] the force of law."'27 In other words, "custom"
serves as a substitute for (otherwise) unexpressed intent.
After Monell, the Court's search for some demonstration of a mu-
nicipality's intent has coincided with its persistent rejection of respon-
deat superior in § 1983 cases. The Court has looked for some written
or other official expression of the requisite malicious intent. Hence,
the problem after Monell has been that the search for a mind has
made little sense in suits against governments, for it has sought the
25. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978).
26. Whitman, supra note 1, at 238.
27. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1970)).
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particular element that exists in individuals but not in institutions-a
state of mind. Asking about negligence or deliberate indifference, at
least as a reflection of attitude or motive, has been a misguided in-
quiry, for institutional defendants lack the characteristics of individual
humans. The cast of mind, implicit in many formulations of the negli-
gence requirement, is inappropriate when the defendant is not an indi-
vidual, but rather an institution or its representative. There is no
single human mind.
After Monell, the Court has assumed without discussion that gov-
ernment acts as government only when it has played the role of deci-
sionmaker or legislature. Hence, the inquiry has taken the form of a
search for the particular persons or particular legislative bodies that
make government decisions. Much of the post-Monell litigation has
revolved around the question of whether a particular official has had
sufficient status and authority to act as a decisionmaker for a munici-
pality. All three of the Court's major decisions in the 1980s on munic-
ipal liability under § 1983 reflect this focus: Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati;28 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik;2 9 and City of Canton v.
Harris.30
Subsequent to these three cases, the Court has been increasingly
hostile to employing respondeat superior in § 1983 cases. The domi-
nant trend has been to insist that a plaintiff suing a municipality under
§ 1983 must show something more than that an individual acted in his
or her official capacity. For example, in Board of County Commis-
sioners v. Brown,31 the question was whether a county could be held
liable under § 1983 based on the county sheriff's decision to hire a
deputy without adequate review of his background. 32 The deputy in
question turned out to be the son of the sheriff's nephew, who was
allegedly prone to violence.33 A divided Court ruled that "it is not
enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly at-
tributable to the municipality. '34 Instead, the plaintiff also must prove
that, through "its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the 'moving
force' behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the
municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability
and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal ac-
28. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
29. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
30. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
31. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
32. Id. at 402.
33. Id. at 401.
34. Id. at 404.
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tion and the deprivation of federal rights. '35 The Court explained
that:
[As] in any § 1983 suit .... the plaintiff must establish the state of
mind required to prove the underlying violation. Accordingly,
proof that a municipality's legislative body or authorized deci-
sionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally pro-
tected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted
culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed
by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates
federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the
moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff
complain[ed]. 36
In so ruling, the Court explained that in order "[t]o prevent municipal
liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into respondeat superior
liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's
inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged. '37 The Court's
declaration appeared to reintroduce the requirement of culpability on
the part of a governmental defendant that its earlier decision in Owen
v. City of Independence38 had found unnecessary. 39 The Court con-
cluded that the requisite "deliberate indifference" had not been
shown.40
Perhaps the most significant sign of the extent of the Court's search
for a municipal state of mind (and thereby to avoid holding cities lia-
ble on the basis of, or similar to, respondeat superior) is reflected in
the Brown Court's rejection of any pretense that its analysis was
grounded in the text or actual legislative history of § 1983.41 The
Court declared that in enacting § 1983 "Congress did not intend mu-
nicipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the
municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights." 42 The
Court had never before suggested that its search for a culpable mind
in § 1983 cases was legitimized by the legislative history of the statute.
As Professor Beermann has shown, the legislative history simply pro-
vides no basis for this assertion. 43
35. Id.
36. Id. at 405.
37. Brown, 520 U.S. at 410.
38. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
39. Id. at 657.
40. Brown, 520 U.S. at 415.
41. Id. at 403.
42. Id. at 415.
43. Beermann, supra note 19, at 665.
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Three of the four dissenters in Brown (excluding Justice Souter) ar-
gued that the time had come to reconsider Monell.44 Justice Breyer
explained that all the prerequisites for reexamination were present:
the "doubtful[ness]" of "the original principle," the "complex" body
of interpretive law that the principle had generated, developments
that had divorced the Monell rule from its "apparent original pur-
poses," and the lack of significant reliance on the rule itself.45
In the Court's other major recent decision on municipal liability, its
aversion to using the doctrine of respondeat superior and thus its
search for a mind to attribute to the institutional defendant was quite
evident. In McMillian v. Monroe County,4 6 the question was whether
a county could be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of a county
sheriff who allegedly had suppressed exculpatory evidence in a crimi-
nal case. 47 The answer depended on whether the county sheriff was a
state or local official for purposes of § 1983.48 State law is significant
in determining not only who is a policymaking official (as in Prapro-
tnik49) but also which entity that official represents when exercising a
policymaking function.50 The Court held that under Alabama law,
county sheriffs acting in their law enforcement capacity represent the
state and not their counties.51 Thus, there could be no local municipal
liability.5 2 The four dissenters argued that the county sheriff had been
acting for the county under Alabama law. 53
The majority undertook a heavily formalistic analysis, emphasizing
that under Alabama state law, county sheriffs under certain circum-
stances "represent" the state and thus should have been treated as
state officers for § 1983 purposes.5 4 In contrast, the dissenters took a
more pragmatic approach, looking past formal labels to examine in-
stead such things as who elected the sheriff (the voters of the county),
who paid his salary (the taxpayers of the county), and the scope of his
jurisdiction (the county).5 5 As the next section suggests, the dissent's
approach opens the door to, if not embraces, institutional analysis.
44. Brown, 520 U.S. at 430-31.
45. Id. at 431 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
47. Id. at 783-84.
48. Id. at 783.
49. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988).
50. McMillan, 520 U.S. at 786.
51. Id. at 793.
52. Id. at 783.
53. Id. at 797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 787.
55. Id. at 799-800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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II.
I have previously suggested that the Court's "policy" or "custom"
prerequisite for municipal liability set forth in Monell has been based
primarily on its balancing of competing constitutional concerns impli-
cated by the statute rather than just the plain language of the text and
close reading of the statute's legislative history.56 As Professor Beer-
mann has shown, this balance has been increasingly skewed over the
past decade or so in favor of one set of concerns-those relating to
the preservation or protection of municipal (and state) autonomy and
finances-at the expense of the other set of relevant concerns-vindi-
cating various federal rights. 57 The loss of this balance-as well as the
pretense to justify the loss on the basis of the text and legislative his-
tory of § 1983-has coincided with the Court's increasingly intense
search for finding a basis to hold cities liable under § 1983 without
employing the doctrine of respondeat superior.
One significant alternative for analyzing municipal liability under
§ 1983 does have the potential for restoring some of the lost balance
in the Court's decisions in this area as well as appropriate fidelity to its
legislative history. This alternative view is the so-called "new institu-
tionalism. ' ' 58 Focusing on the peculiar problems posed for legal analy-
sis by the nature of the institutions whose actions or decisions are
being examined is, of course, not new. For instance, the legal process
school, which became popular in the 1950s, examined the different
fora or processes in which legal decisions or judgments for the pur-
pose of making sense of the latter in light of the peculiar aspects or
institutional biases or practices of the former.5 9 Legal scholars have
developed increasingly sophisticated ways of evaluating how various
institutions with the authority to make legal decisions make those de-
cisions and exercise authority.60
The point of institutional analysis is that institutions take on a spe-
cial life of their own and that the attributes or qualities that distin-
56. Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 541-43.
57. Beermann, supra note 19, at 653-54.
58. For two excellent overviews of the "new institutionalism," particularly as it relates to ad-
ministrative and constitutional law, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOS-
ING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Edward L. Rubin,
Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 463 (1995) (reviewing
KOMESAR, supra).
59. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
60. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
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guish institutional arrangements need to be understood in order to
appreciate the processes and quality of institutional decisionmaking.
Institutions are subject to various external pressures, which affect in-
ternal operations and perspectives. Moreover, external pressures and
internal arrangements pose various consequences for institutional per-
formance. Internal pressures, for instance, influence the perceptions
of insiders of internal and external events. In addition, institutions
differ in their structures, formal and informal internal arrangements,
allocations of decisionmaking authority, and measures of perform-
ance. These differences pose various problems and consequences for
defining the operations or dynamics of decisionmaking within differ-
ent institutions.
The most serious advantage of institutional analysis is that it in-
creases our understanding of the degree to which institutional ar-
rangements influence outcomes. In recent years, the new
institutionalists have primarily examined certain institutional arrange-
ments in the public and private sectors for the purpose of determining
the utility of certain regulatory activities. The new institutionalists
have not yet turned their attention, at least systematically, to the
realm of § 1983 litigation or legislation. Such an effort would provide
not only a fuller examination of the utility of institutional analysis but
also a more sophisticated understanding of municipal liability under
§ 1983.
One of the first steps required in institutional analysis is to define
the institutions within the scope of one's study. Municipal liability
under § 1983 implicates the involvement of at least two different kinds
of institutions. The first is the political process. In any given case rais-
ing issues about municipal liability under § 1983, several different
political processes are involved-federal (principally Congress), state
(including state legislatures, agencies, executives, courts, and political
subdivisions), and local (including cities and counties). The relative
effectiveness of institutions in solving social problems is based on the
differential levels of participation that they allow and the imperfec-
tions in participatory processes that are inherent in their organiza-
tion.61 Moreover, political processes-local, state, and federal-are
vulnerable or subject to special interest groups who can monitor or
discipline their membership to avoid free rider problems and thereby
extract rents from groups that are too large and diffuse to mobilize
their members.62 These large groups are sometimes mobilized by
61. KOMESAR, supra note 58, at 10-11, 53-58, 65-75, 100-12, 128-38.
62. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE Loic OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132-33 (1965).
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political entrepreneurs and are able to extract rents from, or even op-
press, minorities. These large groups also require considerable effort
and means to organize on behalf of a common cause, and the difficulty
of arranging such massive mobilization is an impediment to change.
In contrast, smaller groups are easier to mobilize and, with substantial
funding, can often capture the political process by virtue of their rela-
tive ease in organizing their membership and resources.
Public choice theory is one form of institutional analysis that is
helpful for clarifying the operations of collegial or legislative bodies,
such as Congress or state assemblies.63 Public choice theory suggests
that when institutions make decisions by a majority vote, the majority
will generate logically inconsistent results unless the voters have very
similar preferences.64 In other words, it is a mistake to think of the
collective action of a collegial body as reflecting a single mindset. In-
stead, such action reflects an amalgamation of individual choices.
Moreover, public choice theory suggests that the most effective means
by which to change the orderings of preferences of the individuals par-
ticipating in a group decisionmaking process is through structural al-
terations to the system.65 For instance, the Senate has tried to check
the growth of presidential appointment authority by the efforts of
many senators to dictate to the President whom he should appoint to
offices in their respective states and by delegating often decisive au-
thority (such as agenda setting) to smaller units such as committees or
their chairs, which are potentially subject to domination by a single
person or faction.
For purposes of understanding municipal liability under § 1983, the
nature of the political process is relevant in at least two significant
ways. First, it is important for explaining why § 1983 has not been
modified nor changed in any momentous way in spite of the potential
liability municipalities have faced after Monell. At the congressional
level, one would have thought that change or reform, even radical re-
form, was possible, particularly after the Republicans took control of
Congress in 1994. One would have thought, for instance, that, given
the commitment of many Republicans to protecting various federal-
ism values (such as curbing federal overreaching and preserving as
much state and municipal autonomy as possible), the Republican
leadership in Congress would have been inclined to review if not to
amend § 1983 for the sake of protecting any threatened federalism
63. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 55 (1991).
64. Id.
65. Id.
19991
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
interests of concern to them. In order to make such changes, Republi-
cans (or any other interested parties, for that matter) require organi-
zation, means, and incentives for mobilization in favor of change. The
absence of any such effort reflects not only the difficulties of organiza-
tion but also the apparent absence of the means, pressures, or incen-
tives for a critical mass of members of Congress to amend § 1983. In
addition, many members of Congress might not perceive that munici-
pal liability jurisprudence under § 1983 poses much of a threat to the
federalism values of greatest concern to them. They might perceive,
for instance, that § 1983 has largely become the province of the fed-
eral judiciary rather than the federal legislature, that the federal judi-
ciary has dealt adequately with the issues involved, and that Congress
is better off deferring to the courts in order to allow its members more
opportunity to deal with more pressing issues. Any congressional def-
erence to the federal judiciary might also be based on perceptions of
or belief in federal judges' greater expertise and greater insulation
from volatile public reaction to handle the many controversial civil
rights issues that routinely arise in § 1983 litigation.
Moreover, none of the groups one would expect to have an interest
in amending § 1983 have moved to amend nor succeeded in reforming
§ 1983. Indeed, given that it might require fewer resources or person-
nel to influence one body-Congress-than fifty state legislatures,
one might expect Washington-based interest groups or lobbyists to
have an advantage in addressing the concerns of their memberships
about § 1983. For instance, civil rights groups, which generally have
relative ease in mobilizing because of their size and the intense com-
mitment of their membership to the pursuit of certain values, might
have an interest in revising § 1983 to allow for greater latitude in suing
local governments for civil rights violations. Yet, civil rights groups
probably have less influence than state and local governments (and
their leaders and constituencies) with a Republican Congress than
civil rights groups would have with a Democratically controlled one.
Meanwhile, state and local governments might not feel intensively the
need to lobby Congress for changing § 1983, because of the possibility
of adverse publicity and because the doctrine is relatively congenial to
them (for it has become increasingly hard to sue cities for civil rights
violations over the past decade). The failure to influence Congress is
a function to some extent of states, cities, and other interested parties
not having had such sufficient incentive for pressuring Congress to
amend § 1983.
The other major institution involved in municipal liability cases
under § 1983 is, of course, the federal judiciary. Generally, federal
[Vol. 48:669
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courts are designed to be protected from external political forces, but
this insularity generates high litigation costs and consequently pro-
vides restricted access for many individuals and interests. The federal
courts generally are most effective when low stakes interests are trans-
formed into high stakes interests by the occurrence of a particular
event, such as an injury. Once the parties arrive in court, limitations
on the judiciary's competence and scale produce additional imperfec-
tions or risks in the process. For instance, judicial concerns about the
sizes of caseloads are quite reasonable, given the relatively small
number of federal judges in comparison to the sources of disputes in
society.
Nevertheless, the federal judiciary has largely dictated the fate of
municipal liability under § 1983 for several reasons. First, federal
judges have developed much greater expertise in dealing with § 1983
issues because the issues arise so frequently. Second, federal judges
pose a much smaller, less dispersed, more accessible target for some
groups to try to influence than many other governmental institutions
(such as state governments or Congress). Relatively well financed or
organized groups or parties can focus their energies on a single judge
or small set of judges in order to obtain certain results. Once a court
decides a case, the decision often retains influence, not just with that
court, but also oftentimes with other courts. The higher the court in
an appellate system, the greater the influence it has over other courts.
Third, litigation in federal court offers a significant potential for sub-
stantial rewards. Hence, the desire for vindicating federal rights and
collecting substantial damages are huge incentives for bringing such
litigation. No doubt, the tendency of federal judges to protect federal-
ism concerns or to be sympathetic to the vindication of federal rights
will prove to be more attractive to one side than another in a munici-
pal liability case (depending of course on the judge's particular lean-
ings). Fourth, the federal judiciary has not lobbied for reform of
§ 1983 as it did with respect to habeas. This failure might reflect many
things, including an absence of a widespread feeling in the judiciary
that change is necessary, that the costs and burdens of mobilization
outweigh any likely benefits to be achieved from mobilization, or that
federal judges are reluctant to relinquish any of their authority over
the area to Congress.
After defining the relevant institutions involved in municipal liabil-
ity cases, one should next consider the extent to which clarifying the
nature of these institutions would help to clarify the municipal liability
doctrine or effectuate the purposes of § 1983. As long as municipali-
ties qualify as "persons" for purposes of § 1983 litigation, the real is-
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sues have to do with causation and culpability. These real issues are
how do institutions cause injuries and how should culpability be deter-
mined for the injuries caused. The individual tort model sheds no
light on how institutions cause harm. Institutional analysis does, how-
ever, help to illuminate the relationships among institutional struc-
tures, arrangements, practices, and outcomes (including injuries).
These relationships illuminate the extent to which references to culpa-
bility makes sense with an institutional defendant (for instance, the
identification of an internal arrangement that is likely to cause or that
has caused harm is relevant for establishing causation, while the as-
sessment of how long this set of circumstances has existed as well as
the number of times it has actually resulted in constitutional violations
is pertinent to an inquiry about culpability).
The application of institutional analysis to municipal liability ques-
tions under § 1983 also raises some serious questions about the impact
of such analysis on municipal decisionmaking structure. Some think
that it would have little effect, particularly if the costs for change ex-
ceed the costs of litigation. Others think that the prospect, if not the
fact, of such liability would impose considerable pressure on munici-
palities to improve their training (or evaluation) of their employees
and otherwise to evaluate their organizations or structures in order to
adopt the most cost effective means for providing services with the
least amount of potential for significant liability costs.
The closest analogy for determining the potential impact of institu-
tional analysis on municipal decisionmaking or structure is the influ-
ence of judicial development and enforcement of the doctrine of
respondeat superior on private corporations. 66 First, respondeat supe-
rior developed as a means for providing substantial notice to employ-
ers and employees (as well as consumers) of the kinds of problems for
which the employers may be held liable. Second, the doctrine has
provided a test that judges can easily understand and administer and
that otherwise constrains their discretion. Third, the doctrine devel-
oped in cases involving private defendants in part because those de-
66. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1477 (1996). One of the major problems with making cities liable for any wrongdoing by
their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior is that it is conceivably inconsistent
with the plain language of § 1983. Section 1983 makes liable any "person, acting under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" that causes the deprivation of federal
rights. Respondeat superior focuses on whether someone who works for a city has made a mis-
take or done something that has hurt someone else but not on whether the person has been
acting pursuant to or under the apparent authorization of a "statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage." Institutional analysis avoids this problem, because it places any deprivation of
federal rights within an institutional context, which necessarily reflects or exists as the conse-
quence of a"statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage."
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fendants had to take claims seriously or otherwise risk bankruptcy if
they failed to do so. Because bankruptcy is usually not a realistic pos-
sibility for cities, they might not respond to nor deal with the prospect
of the applicability of respondeat superior in the same manner as pri-
vate businesses or employers have done. Indeed, the prospect of pos-
sible bankruptcy might lead municipalities to invest in insurance or
indemnification that would protect them from insolvency. Such pro-
tection might lead municipalities to spend fewer resources on training
or avoiding constitutional violations because it is no longer in their
economic interests to do so.
Nevertheless, institutional analysis suggests the limitations of this
analysis for two reasons. First, it is possible for civil rights groups or
other interested parties to try to amend § 1983 to counteract whatever
disincentives indemnification would pose for municipalities to take
their constitutional obligations seriously (in spite of the expenses in-
volved for doing so). Of course, the absence of any real reform of
§ 1983 suggests that considerable mobilization would have to occur
and considerable pressure would have to be brought to bear in order
to effectuate meaningful change. Second, if the financial costs of
avoiding violations of constitutional rights were too high for some mu-
nicipalities to muster, the cities remain vulnerable to lawsuits precisely
because of the obvious problems posed or caused by the inadequacies
of their expenditures. Third, municipal governments tend to be cen-
tralized and consist of relatively few administrators, such that these
governments are relatively prone to pressure from well organized and
financed interest groups, such as civil rights organizations. The inter-
est groups no doubt could put a great deal of pressure on cities to
adopt practices that would reduce or avoid practices that would in-
crease the odds of the occurrence of constitutional violations.
III.
Employing institutional analysis in § 1983 cases requires changing
the language and modes of analysis employed in litigating municipal
liability under § 1983. Judges and others have had a penchant-in-
deed, they have been trained-to use formalistic reasoning in han-
dling § 1983 municipal liability issues; such reasoning focuses
primarily on the legal labels for and rigid technicalities of various
power arrangements in a governmental context. Using the individual
tort model to evaluate claims of municipal liability under § 1983 is
further supported by the statute's provision of liability only for a "per-
son" (implying some individual) who has "caused" some harm. Insti-
tutions operate, however, between the generality of formal rules and
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the realm of individual decisionmaking. Institutions provide the arena
in which abstract commands of legal rules and the disparate goals of
individuals intersect and are given meaning and expression. In the
context of cases involving claims of municipal liability for constitu-
tional torts, focusing on institutional operations, arrangements, and
dynamics would raise some significant questions, such as: (1) what are
the external pressures on each of the major institutional actors in-
volved in municipal liability cases brought under § 1983; (2) what dif-
ferences do these external pressures make in the performances of
these institutional actors; and (3) has any part of the internal opera-
tions been captured from interests or factions inside or outside of the
organization? Other significant questions include (1) what are the in-
ternal organizational structures of each of the major institutions in-
volved in § 1983 cases, and (2) what differences do these internal
arrangements make to the performances of those operating inside the
institutions as well as the latters' perceptions of the external pressures
on the institutions?
Organizational theory provides different perspectives on the inter-
nal dynamics or organizations of institutions. These perspectives de-
rive, for example, from the human relations school, decision theory,
and a broad range of approaches regarding organization as a bounded,
interdependent, and generally self-regulating system. 67 Building on
the insights of these different organizational theories, one might con-
sider whether a municipality's structure encourages or discourages
adherence to constitutional standards of behavior; whether a munici-
pality's internal arrangements conceal consequences or dilute respon-
sibility in a way conducive to unconstitutional behavior; and what the
incentive systems created by the structure for those operating within
the structure are.
As one might expect, asking the questions posed by institutional
analysis would almost certainly lead to different reasoning, if not dif-
ferent outcomes, in some of the major municipal liability cases liti-
gated under § 1983. Three examples suffice for present purposes. For
instance, in City of Canton v. Harris,68 the plaintiff sought municipal
liability based on the municipality's allegedly inadequate training of
its jail personnel to recognize the need for serious or moderately seri-
ous health care for prisoners in their charge.69 The pertinent ques-
tions under institutional analysis would have been: (1) how often
health problems requiring specialized medical attention had arisen
67. See Rubin, supra note 58, at 471-72.
68. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
69. Id. at 380.
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among jail inmates; (2) what kind of training (or resources) had been
given to deal with such problems in the defendant municipality; (3)
what kind of training had been devoted to such problems in other
similarly sized cities; and (4) what consequences were likely to have
occurred given the frequency of the problem and the training given or
the resources spent. Comparative data might be especially relevant
for determining the likelihood of certain consequences or outcomes
given a municipality's internal arrangements.
In a second example, Brown, the dissenters appear to have em-
ployed reasoning akin to institutional analysis. As I have previously
indicated, the case dealt with the question of whether a county should
have been held liable under § 1983 because of a county sheriff's fail-
ure to provide an extensive or thorough background check of a dep-
uty, which would have uncovered the latter's propensity for
violence. 70 Institutional analysis would have focused, as Justice Souter
in part did in dissent,71 on determining the usual procedures for hiring
police personnel in the county, whether such procedures were fol-
lowed in Brown, and the likely consequences of deviating from those
practices in Brown.
Finally, it is also possible that institutional analysis would have
posed some different consequences in McMillian. Institutional analy-
sis would have focused on the same kinds of issues examined by the
dissent, which looked past the formalities of state law to determine
the county sheriff's apparent authority.72 As Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded her dissent, "[a] sheriff locally elected, paid, and equipped,
who autonomously sets and implements law enforcement policies op-
erative within the geographic confines of a county, is ordinarily just
what he seems to be: a county official." 73
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's persistent search for an alternative to holding
cities liable on a respondeat superior basis in § 1983 cases has had
significant consequences on its resolution of questions about govern-
mental responsibility for constitutional torts. At the very least, the
Court's aversion to respondeat superior has resulted in a substantial
body of doctrine that has made it more difficult to hold municipalities
accountable for any constitutional wrongs committed by its employ-
ees. The problem is that institutions can cause harm even in the ab-
70. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1997).
71. Id. at 417-18 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 797 (1997).
73. Id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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sence of the malicious intent of some key employees. Institutions can
cause harm as a consequence of the nature of their organizational
structure, including formal lines of decisionmaking and informal ar-
rangements or understandings. Oftentimes in institutions the gaps left
by formal rules or communications allow for the development of in-
formal practices that take on lives, significance, and perceived legiti-
macy of their own.
The purpose of this Article has been to sketch the significance of
the application of institutional analysis to claims of municipal liability
under § 1983. Of course, whether such analysis will be adopted in
such cases is uncertain at best. Ironically, whether institutional analy-
sis will become the appropriate mode for examining government re-
sponsibility for constitutional torts depends on the decisions or actions
of several institutions other than municipalities. To begin with, the
Supreme Court has yet to employ institutional analysis explicitly in
any area of the law. Moreover, while at least three justices seem dis-
posed to overruling Monell, a majority still embrace the language and
reasoning of Monell, including its "policy" or "custom" requirement
for municipal liability. Nor is it certain by any means what, if any,
alternative analysis a majority of the Court would adopt if it were dis-
posed finally to overrule Monell. In addition, Congress seems dis-
posed to leave the future of municipal litigation under § 1983 for the
federal courts to decide. It is also far from certain that substituting
something like institutional analysis for the individual tort model in
municipal liability cases under § 1983 would be popular with either
federal judges or practitioners who operate routinely in the field.
Both judges and practitioners, no doubt, have incurred considerable
expenses and resources to develop their respective expertise in deal-
ing with Monell and its progeny. Their disposition would likely be to
resist rather than to accept change readily. As the development of the
law on municipal liability under § 1983 demonstrates, change, particu-
larly when institutions are the subjects or instruments of change, is no
simple matter. The complexity and difficulty of achieving such change
tells a lot about the present state and likely future of municipal liabil-
ity jurisprudence.
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